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LIKE WARS, NATIONALIST ASPIRATIONS, and the natural rerouting of great rivers,globalization changes the world’s borders by bending and stretching them
out of shape and thus creating new transnational spaces. State borders, which
on maps define political boundaries, no longer draw the line in people’s lives
they once did. Often, borders are still where states interdict goods, people, and
information, legal or otherwise, but they are just as importantly where trade—
including the exit and entrance of people, together with their skills and
knowledge—is most intense. During times of war, even desolate borders, if not
successfully closed, grow hyperactive with the swapping of goods, human be-
ings, intelligence, and creeds. After the 2003 U.S.-led war against Iraq, Iraq’s bor-
der with Iran, though officially closed for 20 years since the beginning of the
Iran-Iraq war, was reopened to religious pilgrims from Iran. But there are also
leaky gateways along the border for smugglers and militants. While former Iraqi
army officers guide anti-American Afghan veterans into Iraq across the rugged
desert, militants disguised as Iranian merchants or religious pilgrims carry illicit
drugs, weapons, and explosives into Iraq to fuel the guerrilla campaign.1 Every-
where, tumultuous forces, sometimes violent, sometimes economic, sometimes
both, are blurring state borders, merging economies closer together and ren-
dering them inexorably interdependent. Borders continue to contain self-de-
scribed national populations and self-described national activity, but the resur-
gence of myriad ethnic groups and regional cultures is pushing and stretching
their limits. New power centers with their own identities are springing out of
once politically trivial landscapes. Smaller, peripheral cities and towns near
newly active borders are growing into important and prosperous centers.
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The pace and scale of changes at the border highlight a central irony of our
time. Borders have become the loci of openness rather than its limit. The late
twentieth century had more national borders than the previous century. Yet
the world was also more open than at any other time in modern history. Com-
pounding the irony is the fact that as the traditional significance of state bor-
ders erodes, border regions are reconfiguring the scope of economic, spatial,
and sociocultural dynamics both within and across global, regional, and local
levels. To add one more layer of contradiction: we all now live in a world
where we grow ever more aware of border dynamics, even when those borders
manifest themselves at remote, distant frontiers that we will never cross. This
is clearly illustrated by the concern of U.S. citizens about border security and
the U.S. government’s redoubled efforts at border enforcement following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The concern strikes Americans as local
and global at the same time; they must guard against an amorphous global
threat to their own communities. America’s newly guarded borders are also
supremely relevant to any nation in the network of global trade. Ironically,
American government policy following September 11 has been to promote in-
ternational trade as the key to peace, but also to strictly enforce U.S. borders.
As economic flows across borders intensify, they generate serious social and
spatial consequences. As Gerald Blake (1994, p. xii) argues, “boundaries create
landscapes, and fundamentally affect communications, settlement patterns,
and access to resources.” Going a step further in this book, I contend that as
borders get pushed and pulled by both domestic and global forces, border re-
gions develop their own distinctive transborder (sub)regional character and
structure that in turn reorganize broader national and local political and eco-
nomic spaces into a new transnational space.
Accelerated Global De-bordering and Re-bordering
Over the last 20 years, national borders in every corner of the globe have un-
dergone an unprecedented opening and blurring that can be dubbed a simul-
taneous de-bordering and re-bordering. Rather than referring to simple, literal
changes of international boundaries, de-bordering and re-bordering describe
a broad, complex process in which borders are considered mutating spaces
rather than fixed lines and where the sovereignty of people acting on their
own plays a more powerful role than a nation acting or struggling to act as a
unified whole. If the national slogan of yesterday was “Out of Many, One,” a
slogan that fits the shifting reality of today’s states is “Out of Many, Many
More.” This reflects the simultaneous processes and outcomes of globalization
and localization. In Rosenau’s (1997) definition, globalization is a process that
compels individuals and their collectives to act similarly and thus broaden
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boundaries or de-emphasize them, while localization is a process that narrows
the horizons of individual and collective actors and heightens the limiting role
of boundaries. With more globalization, the flow of transnational capital and
the types of transborder transactions have multiplied geometrically. As more
national economies are drawn into the global economic system, the total length
of borders open to trade and investment has increased. As most countries in-
tegrate more with the global economy, more sections of and points on their
borders open to more intensive interactions with more powerful forces and ac-
tors beyond their control. While these are features and processes of general de-
bordering, they may hit the countervailing forces of localization. This en-
counter or clash is not necessarily zero-sum. Rather, the meeting of two forces
can result in re-bordering. If, for example, more porous and open borders
bring nasty unintended consequences, such as new cross-border crime or drug
trafficking or dangerous political ideas, and states are forced to rethink their
borders as a result, both globalization and localization will have had an effect.
De-bordering and re-bordering also occur across spaces of every scale, from
local to global. Although bordered nations have become more involved in the
global system, some of the strongest transborder activity is local, with global
ties that are limited or indirect at best. Since economic and sociospatial char-
acteristics of border regions and localities tend to differ from the traditional
or majority characteristics of the nations of which they are part, the effects of
globalization on border regions deserves to be examined up close, in their
own local and regional contexts. This book demonstrates that the intersection
of global, regional, and local forces along and across borders is a major force
behind the formation of transborder subregions. It looks primarily, but not
exclusively, at lands of the Asia-Pacific, where this trend has been particularly
strong over the last 20 years or so. The dynamics of world trade, politics, and
security fall increasingly under the influence of the world’s border regions.
Any consideration of the world’s future must count this trend along with
those driven by more traditionally bordered regions and states.
The Reconfigured Nation-State and National Boundaries
De-bordering and re-bordering have been going on since humans first drew lines
in the sand. State formation is the most common way in which international
boundaries have been drawn and redrawn over time. Against the long history of
state formation, the pace at which nation-states have been created anew or reor-
ganized from earlier states or other political forms (e.g., empires, colonized 
territories) has accelerated through the end of the twentieth century. From 
660 BCE, when Japan came into political existence, to 1776, when the United
States was declared a nation, states came into being on average once every 175
Transborder Dynamics in a Global Era 5
04-505 Ch01 Pt1  10/19/04  12:54 PM  Page 5
years. State formation before the nineteenth century was extremely slow despite
the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which laid the foundation for the
sovereign state. The nineteenth century saw the formation of states at an average
of one every four years, for a total of 28. In the first half of the twentieth century,
one state was formed every 18 months, with 82 states in 1950, while the forma-
tion of states quickened to one in every six months in the latter half of the twen-
tieth century. Just after 1990, 23 new states raised their flags, and most of them
have joined the Untied Nations. By 2003, there were 192 official, independent
states; 191 of them (except the Vatican City) were formal members of the United
Nations.2 The most dramatic surge of state formation occurred in 1991, when
the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the sudden birth of 14 new independent
states, while the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia gave rise to several new
independent states. This type of state re-formation not only has redefined and
reconfigured many national boundaries but also has reshaped the relationship
between the central and local governments of both old and new states.
Generally speaking, as the number of states increases, the total number of na-
tional borders also increases. In mid-1993, there were roughly 311 land bound-
aries in the world, and about 160 of them reached a coast, where they were the
beginning point for offshore boundaries. However, the precise number of both
land and sea boundaries is difficult to establish (Blake, 1994).3 As more borders
are added to the world map, old disputes and new tensions over international
boundaries arise. A number of international boundaries in long-standing dispute
make the status of land and offshore border territories uncertain and subject to
periodic military conflicts. The Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, the site of
potential oil and natural gas, have been claimed by China, Taiwan, Viet Nam,
Malaysia, and the Philippines since Japan gave up its claim in 1951. The contin-
uing dispute has triggered political and military tension between China and the
Philippines in recent years. The long-standing dispute between India and Pak-
istan over Kashmir since 1947, which triggered three border wars through 1999
and claimed 65,000 lives, mostly civilians, flared up again in 2002 during the war
against terrorism in Afghanistan. It remains the most divisive issue for the con-
tentious India-Pakistan relationship, despite the recent efforts and progress by
both countries and the Kashmiri separatists to resolve the territorial conflict.
Successful resolution of border disputes generally leads to renewed and im-
proved cross-border economic and social ties. Illustrative cases include the
growing border trade between China and Viet Nam and China and the Russian
Far East in the 1980s and 1990s. Russia and Kazakhstan, by agreeing to delimit
some 7,500 km of their borderline in 2004 to end the border dispute from the
1991 breakup of the Soviet Union, began new cooperation in fighting against
terrorism, weapons smuggling, drug trafficking, and illegal migration.
A re-bordering was set in motion by the formation of new states, and the
subsequent interface of more borders may be followed by more intensive
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cross-border interactions on a distinctive transnational regional scale. This
type of transborder regional development could be facilitated by revitalized
historical, ethnic, and cultural connections across borders. The Caucasus and
Caspian Sea region in Central Asia is a case in point. The breakup of the So-
viet Union into independent states and autonomous republics, coupled with
its being an important part of the old Silk Road between Europe and Asia,
brought about growing economic activity and initiatives related to the trans-
portation of abundant oil and other commodities across the new borders. In-
stead of through Russia, Uzbekistan has been routing more trainloads of cot-
ton along the Caucasus corridor across the Caspian Sea to the Azerbaijani port
of Baku and on to the Georgian port of Poti. A new pipeline began to pump
oil from Baku to Supsa, near Poti, in 1999. The United States has committed
funds to explore the feasibility of building a US$2.5 billion,4 1,650-km oil line
from the Azerbaijani capital of Baku, through Georgia, to Turkey’s deep-water
port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea.5 These costly transnational infra-
structure projects, however, have been slow to start due to continued political
instability and ethnic conflict, which exemplifies the kind of complexities in-
volved in the transborder subregions examined in several later chapters.
Formal Regional Integration and Border Transformations
Another driving force behind the accelerated global de-bordering and re-
bordering is the formation of formally integrated regional unions or trade
blocs such as the European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).
Illustrations from the European Union
While the European Union provides an institutionalized supranational coop-
erative framework and a governance structure, the removal of trade barriers and
freer transnational mobility of production factors have had an uneven local im-
pact on the status, identity, and role of border cities and towns and their interac-
tions. The French town of Saverne provides an example. Located in the Alsace re-
gion of northeastern France bordering Germany and Switzerland, Saverne and
the surrounding area changed to German control four times between 1648 and
1944, when it was last reclaimed by France. This history, coupled with a border
location, has imbued its people with neither a French identity nor a German one.
In recent years, Saverne has taken on a pro-European appearance and identity,
with EU flags flying everywhere, local residents gathering in the Euro Bar next to
the Hotel Europe, and the mayor nicknamed “Mr. Europe.”6 (See chapter 8 for a
discussion of the trinational Alsace-Baden-Basel border subregion).
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Regional integration has also reinforced or reshaped the structure and scope
of border regions or subregions under the overarching supranational system. To
promote cross-border cooperation, a number of Dutch and German municipal-
ities created the EUREGIO, one of the oldest border regions in Europe, in the
1950s. In the early 1990s, the EUREGIO comprised 106 municipalities in an area
with 1.9 million residents. Under the EU, initiatives for cooperation along the
border of Germany and the Netherlands have been increasing. The EU’s policy
for stimulating development in economically disadvantaged regions has revital-
ized many of the 40 unevenly developed “Euregions” defined at the end of the
1980s.7 One such border region that began to seek new economic opportunities
is the Euregion Maas-Rhine, located along the Dutch-Belgian-German borders.
It is geographically larger than the older EUREGIO and has pursued cross-
border cooperation since 1976 (see chapter 8 for a discussion of both cases).
Examples from NAFTA
The North American Free Trade Agreement offers an exemplary context in
which the local impact of formal transnational regional integration on border
cities and regions has become more visible and intensified. Economic inte-
gration over the U.S.-Mexico border has accelerated since the onset of NAFTA
in 1994, evidenced by the border-intensive nature of Mexico’s rapidly growing
importation of U.S. recoverable waste. In El Paso, Texas, hundreds of flatbed
trucks, container-haulers, and tankers line up at the border to cross into Mex-
ico each day, carrying waste paper, beverage-container glass, scrap metals, and
plastics to be recycled. In San Diego, California, 2,000 tons of glass containers
are collected by a U.S. company each month and sent to its plant in the Mex-
ican border city of Mexicali. In Mexicali, 19 tons of plastic waste are gathered
each week from foreign-owned maquiladora plants by a local company and
shipped to Guadalajara. In 1997, Mexico imported between US$500 million to
US$1 billion worth of U.S. recoverable waste, surpassing South Korea to be-
come the second most popular destination for U.S. waste, after Canada. The
booming of border manufacturing in Mexico after NAFTA has brought some
prosperity to its border cities, which in turn has enlivened the traditional bor-
der business of recycling tires. With about 5 million old truck, car, and mo-
torcycle tires littered in the city, four tires for each resident, Mexicali has be-
come a dominant used-tire city in North America. It has created many jobs in
the local tire retreading shops and provided a large and nearby market for
U.S.-based tire exporters. However, the buildup of used tires in Mexicali poses
a threat to California’s Imperial Valley—a lush agricultural region just across
the border—as tire dumps are likely to turn into tire fires,8 while other forms
of wastes also pose hazards (see Frey, 2003).
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Another old problem has haunted the U.S.-Mexico border. For decades, un-
treated waster from the leaky sewage system in Tijuana has flowed down
through the Tijuana River into the U.S. border communities, negatively affect-
ing local residents. This seemingly mundane local problem has become com-
plicated and magnified in the border context as international diplomacy and
multitudes of municipal, state, and federal government agencies of both na-
tions have been involved. Some progress has been made. A joint treatment
plant was constructed on U.S. soil that captures and partly cleans about 25 mil-
lion gallons of the overflow waste each day, and US$140 million was spent on
projects in Mexico to expand Tijuana’s sewer system and plug leaks that send
waste to the U.S. side during heavy winter rains. In 1998, a treatment plant
north of the border, built and run by the United States with help from Mexico,
began operation, which sent treated waste through a huge pipe directly into the
ocean. The persistent problem illustrates the complexity of border pollution or
any other border-related issue that typically involves binational agreements,
cooperation among multiple government agencies at various levels, border
community residents, and such non-government organizations (NGOs) as en-
vironmentalist groups.9 Apparently, the formal transnational regional arrange-
ment of NAFTA, which was concerned primarily with such macroeconomic is-
sues as trade and investment, neglected cross-border environmental issues and
thus has little binding effect on pollution along the U.S.-Mexico border.
NAFTA has induced change in transborder flows and regulation of the his-
torically very open U.S.-Canada border. First of all, NAFTA allowed Canadi-
ans to obtain temporary work visas at the border quickly. This has accelerated
the effort of U.S. companies with severe shortages of high-tech workers to re-
cruit Canadian talent with top salaries and other perquisites. A large number
of U.S. companies recruit graduates at the University of Waterloo in Kitch-
ener, Ontario, near the border with the United States. The university has a top-
ranked computer science department and serves as a major training ground
for Canadian computer scientists and engineers. This southbound “brain
drain” continues, even though new U.S. immigration regulations in effect
since April 1997 have begun to restrict easy entry of Canadian business trav-
elers into the United States. At the border, businesspeople that do not need
visas because of NAFTA often get mixed with people who are required to have
a visa to work in the United States. One Toronto-based computer consulting
firm reported a loss of contracts because its U.S. clients have stopped using
Canadian consultants due to the difficulties in getting them across the bor-
der.10 The evidence suggests that even though the 6,440-km U.S.-Canada bor-
der, the world’s longest land boundary and one of the busiest, has become
more open and porous under NAFTA, the latter has complicated the eco-
nomic, environmental, and travel conditions on both sides of the line. Since
Transborder Dynamics in a Global Era 9
04-505 Ch01 Pt1  10/19/04  12:54 PM  Page 9
September 11, 2001, the threat of terrorists slipping through this border, most
of which is rural and lightly protected, has further complicated control.
Transborder Transactions and Informal Subregional Clustering
While supranational regional integration has created a certain amount of
global de-bordering and re-bordering, the latter has been triggered by more
extensive transborder links and intensive transactions of a subregional scale,
without a formal integration of entire national economies through inter-state
treaties or agreements. This phenomenon is represented by the Asia-Pacific
transborder subregions that differ from the EU or NAFTA trade blocks in
three crucial ways. First, they generally involve multiple subnational territorial
units with a more intensive border focus, rather than several entire nation-
states. Second, they usually have a smaller spatial scope than the continental
size and spread of the EU or NAFTA. Third, they are much less institutional-
ized and often have an informal governance structure (see chapter 3 for a dif-
ferentiation between formal and informal subregional integration).
The Asia-Pacific transborder subregions are variably labeled as “Growth Tri-
angles” (see Chia and Lee, 1993; Parsonage, 1992), “Region States” (Ohmae,
1995), or “Natural Economic Territories” (Scalapino, 1995). Since I will describe
the transborder subregions in detail in chapter 2, the task here is to merely lo-
cate the rough spatial contour of all the Asia-Pacific transborder subregions,
which will be subject to in-depth case and comparative studies in later chapters.
Locating the Asia-Pacific Transborder Subregions
From Northeast Asia on the western Pacific Rim, several transborder subre-
gions stretch south and west to include both mainland and maritime Southeast
Asia (see map 1.1). In Northeast Asia, a transborder subregion, designated the
Greater Tumen Subregion (GTS) in this study, comprises three areas: the south-
eastern border region of China’s Jilin province, centered on the cities of Hunchun
and Tumen; the northern border area of North Korea, featuring the port cities of
Rajin and Sonbong; and the Khasan region of the Russian Far East (RFE), an-
chored on the port city of Posyet and the southern Maritime Territory around
Vladivostok. This GTS transborder subregion is physically defined by the Tumen
River that connects the border areas of the three riparian states—China, North
Korea, and Russia (see chapter 6). Spatially contiguous and economically con-
nected with the GTS is a long border zone that closely links China’s Heilongjiang
province and the RFE. The broad hinterland of the GTS may include transna-
tional links among China’s northeast, the RFE, eastern Mongolia, North Korea,
South Korea, and Japan’s coastal region facing the Sea of Japan.
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MAP 1.1
Seven Asia-Pacific Transborder Subregions
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Farther south and west of the GTS is a transborder subregion that is desig-
nated the Bohai/Yellow Sea Subregion (BYSS) in this study. It consists of the
coastal zones of China’s Liaoning and Shandong provinces plus Beijing and
Tianjin, South Korea’s west coast, and Japan’s Kyushu region. The components
of the BYSS, unlike those of the GTS, are internally connected and delimited
only by sea borders. The boundaries of the GTS and BYSS, most widely de-
lineated, would make the two transborder subregions almost contiguous and
overlapping with some links, thus enveloping much of Northeast Asia. How-
ever, the GTS and BYSS are analyzed separately here (in chapters 5 and 6) to
focus on subregional and local diversities.
A transborder subregion in East Asia, designated the Greater Southeast China
Subregion (GSCS) in this study, covers China’s Guangdong and Fujian provinces,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao. (The GSCS is examined in chapter 4.)
To the west of the GSCS, in Southeast Asia, is a transborder subregion des-
ignated the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) in this study. The GMS extends
over China’s Yunnan province, Myanmar, Lao People’s Democratic Republic
(Lao PDR), Thailand, Cambodia, and Viet Nam. Unlike the previous subre-
gions, the GMS comprises mainly nation-states; the exception is China’s Yun-
nan province. This subnational unit, coupled with border-specific and inten-
sive interactions among the countries, qualifies the GMS as a transborder
subregion rather than a formal regional scheme like the EU. Given its large
area and the participation of six countries, the GMS features the longest
length and the largest number of national borders, some of which are land-
locked. (The GMS is discussed in chapter 7.)
Away from mainland Asia and spread across the entire maritime Southeast
Asia are three distinctive transborder subregions or growth triangles, as they
are commonly known in the region. The first is the Indonesia-Malaysia-
Singapore growth triangle (IMS-GT), which consists of Singapore, the state of
Johor in peninsular Malaysia, and the Riau province of Indonesia. The
Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand growth triangle (IMT-GT) encompasses the 14
provinces of southern Thailand, the four states of northwestern Malaysia, and
the two Sumatran provinces of western Indonesia. The Brunei-Indonesia-
Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA, hereafter ab-
breviated as EAGA) includes Brunei Darussalam, southern Mindanao and the
island province of Palawan of the Philippines; North Sulawesi of Indonesia
and the two adjacent Indonesian provinces on the island of Borneo (East and
West Kalimantan); and the Malaysian territories of Sabah, Sarawak and
Labuan. Unlike the transborder subregions along the edge of mainland Asia,
the three maritime Southeast Asian growth triangles are organized, bounded,
and crisscrossed largely by sea borders. (These maritime transborder subre-
gions are discussed in chapter 7.)
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In terms of geography and demography, the transborder subregions have a
collective significance for the entire Asia-Pacific region that cannot be
overemphasized. They cover a large block of mainland and maritime Asia and
contain a sizeable share of the region’s total population. The GSCS, for exam-
ple, spans 340,000 sq km and has a combined population of 126 million. The
more expansive GMS covers 2.3 million sq km and includes a total population
of 229 million (see chapter 7). If we measure these subregions by the distance
from their dominant centers to their hinterlands, these areas would be even
larger. In the BYSS, there are more than 300 million people living within two
hours of air travel from Seoul (W. Kim, 1990). In economic terms, the seven
transborder subregions encompass mostly subnational parts or all of 16 Asian
and other economies that cover the whole spectrum of development levels
and stages, from Japan and South Korea at one end and Lao PDR and Cam-
bodia at the other, with Thailand and China somewhere in between. The
seven subregions cut across approximately 25 land and offshore boundaries.11
Besides including such dominant hubs and gateways as Hong Kong and
Singapore that anchor their respective subregions, the transborder subregions
have enabled a large number of small border cities and towns to grow from
previously peripheral and isolated positions to the development forefront and
to connect directly or indirectly with the global economy. One of them, Dong-
guan, in southeastern China has even risen to the status of world’s largest and
most concentrated manufacturing location for computer peripherals (see
chapter 4).
The Central Argument: From Barriers to Bridges and Back
The comparative analysis of such a diverse set of cases is guided by one cen-
tral argument: borders are shedding their traditional barrier effects and are
playing a more bridging role in the Asia-Pacific area and elsewhere, although
this role does lapse back under changed circumstances. The shift from barrier
to bridge, and maybe back to barrier, is a more intuitive shorthand for ex-
pressing the complex twin concept of de-bordering and re-bordering. Al-
though the barrier-to-bridge shift is not smooth and linear, it is indeed taking
place across the previously closed and heavily guarded borders. These borders
used to function as political barriers that blocked economic and cultural ex-
changes to differing degrees. They also existed as military frontiers that re-
ceived heavy defense spending but little economic assistance. As a result, the
zones around these borders became marginalized. Due to changes in a variety
of conditions, these borders have begun to bridge separate and isolated local
and regional economies. The emerging transnational spaces have provided
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new opportunities for global-local links, perhaps generating self-sustaining
local development that would not be possible without the presence of a trans-
border subregion.
The bridging role of borders in the transborder subregions is a complex
one. Bridging creates a cooperative space between binational or trinational
economies. Broadly viewed, bridging generates economic growth and trans-
actions that can spread beyond the immediate border zones to other parts of
the transborder subregions. On the other hand, bridging may turn borders
and border zones into new contested terrains for illegal migration, drug
smuggling, spillover pollution, and other undesirable outcomes. States may
respond to these threats by reimposing border control, thus moving back to-
ward the barrier role of borders. This reassertion of state authority was char-
acterized by Andreas (2000a, 2000b) as re-bordering, which he examined at
length in the contexts of states controlling and policing illegal drug smuggling
and immigration across the U.S.-Mexico border and the EU’s emerging east-
ern boundary. While I share this notion of re-bordering to some extent, my
argument about the borders shifting from barriers to bridges and back un-
derscores a broader conceptualization of de-bordering in relation to re-
bordering. In contending that the bridging role of borders has become
stronger than at anytime before, and that the bridging role is now stronger
than the barrier role, I focus on extensive de-bordering in terms of strong
links and heavy flows across a large number of international boundaries in
several subregional settings. The links and flows in turn usher in a re-
bordering process by connecting border cities and their hinterlands into a
transnational spatial network that spans multiple boundaries and beyond.
This kind of re-bordering is different from and unlikely to be completely re-
versed by state-initiated re-bordering through enhanced border controls.
Re-bordering After September 11 and SARS:
A Temporary Reversal in a Long-term Trend
The argument about borders changing from barriers to bridges and back has
become more salient in light of the terrorist attacks on the United States on
September 11, 2001, and the subsequent government response to border secu-
rity. The terrorists appear to have taken advantage of the very open borders of
the United States for visitors and other flows, especially from and through
Canada and Mexico. Before September 11, foreign visitors were not carefully
checked if they crossed over a land border and could convince an immigration
inspector that they were a citizen of Canada or Mexico. In the wake of the ter-
rorist attacks, the United States created the Department of Homeland Security
and clamped down on border control, which immediately affected cross-
14 Chapter 1
04-505 Ch01 Pt1  10/19/04  12:54 PM  Page 14
border economic transactions and social life. Tightened inspections at the
U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders slowed down the normal trucking traf-
fic. Drivers had to wait two or three hours to cross from Ciudad Juárez, Mex-
ico, to El Paso, Texas, which usually takes no more than 45 minutes during peak
traffic times. There arose the concern that the slowed flow of commerce would
set back efforts to integrate the economies of the United States, Canada, and
Mexico under NAFTA (see chapter 8). As Mexicans stopped coming over for
shopping due to the long wait through the border crossings, the retail busi-
nesses in the Texas border cities and towns of McAllen, Laredo, and
Brownsville, which cater heavily to Mexican customers, suffered badly. The
heightened security interrupted the traditional ways of life for the Tohono
O’odham Indians, a 24,000-member nation whose lands span large parts of
northern Mexico and southern Arizona. Many members have stopped crossing
the border to visit relatives or to attend traditional religious festivals for fear of
being regularly stopped by the Border Patrol.12 The new fingerprinting proce-
dure at major U.S. air and sea ports, implemented in January 2004, has length-
ened the time of entry for 24 million foreign visitors traveling with visas.13
The outbreak of SARS in China’s Guangdong province and its spread to
Hong Kong and beyond in 2003 cast the border between them into interna-
tional spotlight, this time not for their economic dynamism. It also posed a
major challenge to the regional governments on both sides of the porous and
“infected” boundary. It was reported that a medical professor from Zhong-
shan University in Guangzhou infected a group of people during his stay in a
Hong Kong hotel, while one of the people in the group spread the disease at
the Prince of Wales Hospital (where the mainland professor later died) and
then the Amoy Gardens residential complex. One family living there packed
up their belongings immediately and returned to their native town in Guang-
dong. But after they fell sick in Guangdong, they recrossed the border to seek
better treatment in Hong Kong. According to official estimates, 10 percent of
the people with SARS in Hong Kong had visited the mainland before they got
infected. Besides driving down the number of cross-border visits by 40 per-
cent, the crisis raised new issues concerning cross-border integration, such as
choice of residence and environmental and public hygiene, which go beyond
the more dominant economic and transportation issues regarding the facili-
tation of growing cross-border investment flows and vehicle traffic. While the
immediate, knee-jerk reaction from some in Hong Kong was to propose re-
strictions on the flow of people across the border, including banning non-
essential visits, the SARS crisis has sharpened the sense of common destiny for
Guangdong and Hong Kong and both economic and social integration be-
tween them. Although the Hong Kong government took some emergency
measures, such as checking the temperature of border crossers (see the photo
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in the preface), it began to seek more extensive cooperation with the Guang-
dong government to set up a formal mechanism to combat the disease and
control its spread14 and budding recurrence in early 2004. However, it remains
to be seen whether this cross-border government cooperation in response to
a crisis will sustain itself for the long-term need of guiding deeper and wider
integration, given the largely market-driven nature of the cross-border eco-
nomic links, the lassie-faire tradition of the Hong Kong government, and the
difficulty for Hong Kong to fully cooperate with the Guangdong government,
which still operates with the constraints of a control-oriented central govern-
ment in Beijing, as illustrated by the latter’s insistence on lab testing for con-
firming the SARS virus in Beijing in early 2004.
The above developments suggest that the barrier aspect of borders can be
resurrected and strengthened by government policy in response to disastrous
events, which are illustrated further by the frantic policies of countries to ban
imported beef and kill millions of chicken during an isolated incidence of mad
cow disease in the United States at the end of 2003 and a limited spread of bird
flu in several Asian countries in early 2004. They point to the coexisting and in-
separable function of borders as both barriers and bridges. This function of
borders may shift back and forth between barrier and bridge depending on dif-
ferent contexts and changing conditions within these contexts. In the Asia-
Pacific transborder subregional context, the bridging role of borders has been
gaining strength in spite of the existing and emerging barriers created by state
policies and the lack of transport infrastructure. The evidence is compelling
that broad de-bordering and re-bordering has permeated the Asia-Pacific re-
gion in the form of several transborder subregions as contact and cooperative
zones. Although this study is sensitive to ways in which borders continue to
impede cooperation and even create conflict, it aims at proving that the Asia-
Pacific transborder subregions represent a broad and sustainable long-term
trend toward cross-border cooperation and integration. This book suggests
that despite the kind of re-bordering in terms of escalated security measures at
the U.S. borders after September 11, 2001, and infection control and quaran-
tine procedures at the Guangdong–Hong Kong border and other borders
across Asian countries after SARS in 2003, they amount to a mere temporary
reversal in the inevitable, long-term trend in global de-bordering and re-
bordering, as demonstrated by the extensive evidence in this book.
A Conceptual Preview: Multiple Lenses for Integrated Insights
The central argument advanced above raises the crucial analytical question
of how to account for the diversity among several transborder subregions in
the Asia-Pacific context and elsewhere. As the earlier geographic profile indi-
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cates, these transborder subregions comprise three or more subnational bor-
der regions or areas across multiple contiguous or adjacent international
boundaries. This composition creates several layers and inevitably uneven ties
among the differently scaled territorial units. While complex, the composition
of the transborder subregions makes them rich cases to interface with theo-
retical perspectives along multiple dimensions.
Before I provide a foretaste of this interface from the theoretical side, it is
important to ask when these transborder subregions emerged and how they
really differ from other seemingly similar regional formations. Chapter 2 ad-
dresses these questions by offering a long historical view of the economic, cul-
tural, and spatial links among some of the areas involved in the transborder
subregions today, as a way of assessing whether the latter had any geographic
antecedents. Moving from distant to recent history, chapter 2 also examines
why the Cold War era prevented the transborder subregions from emerging
until it ended around 1990. The relevance of a geohistorical versus a political
economy claim is assessed in anticipation of developing the more compre-
hensive framework in chapter 3. Having dated the recent timing of the trans-
border subregions, chapter 2 develops a nuanced conceptualization of the
Asia-Pacific transborder subregion by decomposing its constituent units and
then refitting them into a nested hierarchy. While this exercise differentiates
the transborder subregion from formal supranational schemes such as the EU,
it signals the existence of more informal cross-border subregional formations
underneath. Ending with an identification of the important characteristics
and dimensions of the transborder subregion, chapter 2 paves the way for set-
ting up the analytical framework in chapter 3.
The key to an integrated analytical framework for these cases is to bring to-
gether relevant theoretical perspectives and apply them in a coherent and
complementary fashion. From the standpoint of the cases, it is highly impor-
tant to know how to array them and use their attributes as evidence to illu-
minate significant theoretical debates. Having evaluated what theoretical lit-
eratures may be most relevant to the cases, I have settled on organizing the
important elements of the literatures into four analytical lenses, examining
the economic, political, sociocultural, and spatial dimensions of the cases se-
quentially and also interactively. Reciprocally, I interpret the comparative ev-
idence on the cases in light of the analytical lenses to produce insights on the
debated theoretical issues.
To begin with, I draw selectively from the vast globalization literature to
build an economic lens (the global-local nexus) focusing on how the transbor-
der subregions mediate or restructure cross-border links between the world
economy and local places. Some of the literature on economic globalization
speaks to the strong impact of trade and investment on the interdependence
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and integration among national economies without paying specific attention
to how this impact varies across regional and local areas (see chapter 3). Glob-
alization scholars who deal with specific localities tend to be concerned with
how major international metropolises have become global or world cities (see
Friedmann, 1986; Sassen, 2001; but see Robinson, 2002, for a recent exception).
This omission and bias in the research has left us with both an inflated and lim-
ited view of how global economic forces impact or interact with national or
local economies. The global-local economic lens reveals that the impact and
penetration of the global economy can be mediated or redirected by the varied
mixes of comparative advantages and complementarities of the constituent
units to yield uneven growth and integration within a transborder subregion.
Looking at specific border cities through the global-local economic lens also
reveals the extent to which some of them may remain disconnected and thus
will not benefit much from the global economy, due to natural endowments
and traditional local-local economic ties specific to a transborder subregion.
While the GSCS demonstrates the positive mediating effect on global-local
economic links (see chapter 4), the GTS may exemplify the constraining influ-
ence (see chapter 6). The insight gained from these two and other cases is that
to understand the local impact of the global economy and local responses, we
must study the mediating role of such in-between structures as the transbor-
der subregions.
One of the other factors bearing crucially on the transborder subregions is
the relative role of the state at the central or local level. To capture this role, I
have constructed a second analytical lens that looks for different forms of de-
centering tendencies and practices of the state that are abundant in the trans-
border subregional context. Basically, the de-centering state in the transborder
subregions manifests itself both institutionally and spatially. In an institutional
sense, de-centering takes the primary form of the central state decentralizing
flexible policy-making power to border regions and cities in order to rebalance
uneven development or target certain areas to take advantage of existing or po-
tential global links. This leads to the rise of local autonomy in varying degrees
that facilitates or impedes cross-border cooperation. Institutional de-centering
also is reflected in the central states yielding or transferring some policy-making
power to the supranational level for the sake of promoting cross-border coop-
eration. Spatial de-centering of the state, in a related way, takes the form of un-
even scattering and diffusion of the authority and influence of the national
government from the political center to previously neglected and marginalized
border areas (see chapter 3). In the GSCS, the institutional and spatial de-
centering has blended into considerable decentralization and effective local au-
tonomy in China’s Guangdong and Fujian provinces, thus successfully foster-
ing favorable global-local economic links and the rapid growth and integration
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of the entire subregion (see chapter 4). On the other hand, the lack of genuine
decentralization and local autonomy in the RFE and North Korea, especially
the latter, has hampered the growth and integration of the GTS in conjunction
with other complicating factors (see chapter 6).
One other cluster of factors that interacts with the economic and political
forces in shaping the transborder subregions can be adequately subsumed
under the analytical lens of cross-border social capital. To construct this ana-
lytical lens, I have pulled together several elements such as historical legacies,
ethnic identity, kinship ties, and linguistic similarity and reconfigured them
into action-oriented social networks that have uneven presence in the trans-
border subregions. Through this analytical lens, I intend to show that these
cross-border social networks matter a great deal in enabling economic links
across the border areas, with the qualifying argument that more extensive and
stronger social networks have a more powerful influence. A reasoned employ-
ment of this analytical lens is dependent on recognizing that many elements
of cross-border social capital lay dormant under closed-border economies
and political tension and have only resurfaced recently in the more open and
interactive environment of a transborder subregion (see chapter 3). The sharp
contrast in the effectiveness of this cross-border social capital is reflected in
the GSCS (chapter 4) and the GTS (chapter 6). Viewed from this analytical
lens, the cases demonstrate that the concept of social capital, which is typically
applied at the individual or group level and has been proven useful for think-
ing about regional development, sheds considerable light on the aggregate
performance of the transborder subregions (see X. Chen, 2000c).
Finally, there needs to be an analytical lens that scans the effects of geo-
graphic proximity and cross-border transportation infrastructure on the
transborder subregions. A key rationale for this lens is that distance, which has
lost some frictions in a globalizing world, is almost by definition central to the
formation of a transborder subregion. In another and perhaps more ironic
sense, short distance in terms of geographic contiguity or adjacency is impor-
tant because it does not necessarily reduce the natural and artificial barrier ef-
fects of international boundaries that could impede the growth and integra-
tion of a transborder subregion. Besides some location constraints, such as
difficult topography and lack of access to sea, the generally less developed
cross-border transport links, coupled with the lack of large-scale resources
and cross-national cooperation for improving them, negate the advantages of
short physical distance between the constituent units of a transborder subre-
gion. Applying the spatial lens to the cases reveals how geographic proximity
and cross-border transport links, jointly or independently, facilitate or inhibit
the economic, political, and sociocultural factors in determining the forma-
tion of the transborder subregions. In the BYSS, the presence of an extensive
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and still expanding network of air and shipping links has been effective in
bridging ocean boundaries (see chapter 5). While it is difficult to link wider
distances across a large number of land borders in the expansive GMS due to
the shortage of financial resources in the least developed Asian countries in-
volved, the prioritized assistance and financing from the Asian Development
Bank (ADB) has alleviated the problem (see chapter 7).
Each of the four analytical lenses draws from a particular body of the litera-
ture and is intended to illuminate a distinctive dimension of the transborder
subregion. Only in coming together in an integrated framework with cross-
references do they work in unison to provide a comprehensive explanation for
the similarities and differences among the primary and secondary cases in
chapters 4 through 7. The key is to apply these analytical lenses consistently
across the cases and be specific about how they complement one another
within each case. If this is successfully executed, the cases will shed light on the
key theoretical issues that lie behind the analytical lenses. To help stretch the
analytical scope of these lenses, I extend the comparative reach to several cases
in the U.S.-Mexican and European contexts (see chapter 8). These cases
demonstrate how far out the four analytical lenses can see, and they suggest
factors that lie beyond the purview of the lenses but nevertheless bear on cross-
border subregional dynamics. In the final chapter, I look through the analyti-
cal lenses again to highlight the theoretical insights from the set of primary and
secondary cases and then turn to the practical challenges posed by these trans-
border subregions to governance and possible responses to the challenges.
Pushing Beyond What We Have Known
By subjecting a range of cases to a broad comparative analysis within an in-
tegrated framework, this book moves beyond the existing literature on the sub-
ject, which suffers from three main deficiencies. First of all, there is a lack of a
systematic and comprehensive framework that can make overall sense of a fairly
large number of discrete case studies and lead to generalizable conclusions. Al-
though several edited volumes have attempted to bring multiple cases together,
they either did not devote a balanced attention to all the important dimensions
and factors involved or placed major emphasis on policy issues (see Chen and
Kwan, 1997; Perkmann and Sum, 2002; Thant, Tang, and Kakazu, 1998). The
framework developed here offers a badly need analytical synthesis.
Second, the literature has not provided a balanced and explicitly compara-
tive coverage of all the Asia-Pacific transborder subregions; the overwhelming
emphasis has been on the South China–Hong Kong–Taiwan triangle (or the
so-called Greater China), with a secondary focus on the Singapore-Johor-Riau
triangle. Besides the numerous articles, a number of edited volumes (see
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Kwok and So, 1995; Shambaugh, 1995; Naughton, 1997; Drover, Johnson, and
Lai Po-wah, 2001; Yeh et al., 2002) have focused on Greater China, especially
bilateral links between Guangdong and Hong Kong and between Southeast-
ern China and Taiwan. Studies of the Singapore-Johor-Riau growth triangle
have expanded from an early edited book of largely descriptive accounts (Lee,
1991) to a series of more detailed article-length analyses (see Chia and Lee,
1993; Peachey, Perry, and Grundy-Warr, 1998; Grundy-Warr, Peachey, and
Perry, 1999). Comparative efforts to bring these two cases together are rare
(see Ho and So, 1997). For the first time, this book pulls together seven cases
of transborder subregional integration by treating three of them as primary
cases and four as secondary cases in an integrated framework.
The third inadequacy in the literature is a shortage of efforts to integrate
analyses at different spatial scales (as illustrated in figure 2.1 in chapter 2),
with even less attention paid to the nested relations across these levels, espe-
cially the highly localized ties between border cities and their direct or indi-
rect links to the global economy. This is truer of the works focusing on the less
studied cases such as the Tumen River region and the Greater Mekong Subre-
gion (see Rozman, 1997, 1998a; Valencia, 1995; Asian Development Bank
[ADB], 1996a, 1996b, 2002a, 2002b). This book strives to maintain a close
scrutiny of the trans-local and global-local ties mediated by higher-order, in-
between relations within the transborder subregions, particularly in the three
primary cases (chapters 4–6). While chapter 3 introduces the integrated
framework with the four analytical lenses, the historical backdrop and con-
ceptual foundation for that framework lie in chapter 2, to which we now turn.
Notes
1. “Porous border a portal for potential terrorists,” Chicago Tribune, September 15, 2003, p. 6.
2. The total number of states in 1950 (82) was reported by World Atlas (DK Publishing,
1997); the total number of states in 2003 (191) was reported in the United Nations’ website,
www.un.org/overview. Many of the new states formed in the 1990s are successors to the former
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Future potential new states may emerge from Israel (a Palestinian
state), Canada (Quebec), and the two Koreas (through unification).
3. The precise number of land boundaries depends on whether micro-territories are in-
cluded, and whether boundaries with more than one sector are counted once or twice. Eventu-
ally, agreed maritime boundaries will outnumber land boundaries, despite the continued prolif-
eration of new states (see note 2 above). However, maritime delimitation is impossible if there
is uncertainty or dispute over the land boundary at the coast (Blake, 1994, p. xiii).
4. Throughout the book, monetary amounts are given in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.
5. The information and discussion on Central Asia here has been derived from three articles
in the Wall Street Journal: “Silk road enjoys new life amid calm in Caucasus,” March 3, 1998,
p. 14; “Scramble for oil in Central Asia hits roadblocks,” March 13, 1998, p. A12; “U.S. pledges
Caspian Sea oil funds,” June 1, 1998, p. A12.
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6. “Europeans search for a shared identity amid dark memories,” Wall Street Journal, Octo-
ber 19, 1998, pp. A1, A12.
7. “Euregions” (the term combines “European” and “regions”) are located along the internal
borders of the European Union and involve some form of cross-border cooperation between
(semi)public organizations. A “Euregion” can be considered an organized border region
(Corvers, Dankbaar, and Hassink, 1996, p. 175).
8. These accounts were taken from two Wall Street Journal reports, “Destination Mexico:
U.S. scrap enlivens border trade,” January 29, 1998, p. A13; “Mexico’s ‘tire mountain’ worries U.S.
neighbors,” May 17, 1998, pp. B1, B4.
9. Reported in “U.S., Mexico push for solution to border pollution,” Chicago Tribune, Janu-
ary 3, 2002, p. 9.
10. The accounts were from two Wall Street Journal articles, “Canada frets high-tech ‘brain
drain,’” May 12, 1998, p. A16; “U.S. traps Canadians in a one-size-fits-all border-control policy,”
June 4, 1998, p. A13.
11. The shared boundary between two states is counted only once. For example, the six par-
ticipating states in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) have 10 boundaries, instead of 18 if
the shared boundaries are counted twice. If a participating area in a transborder subregion joins
two other national borders, it is counted twice. For example, Singapore borders Malaysia’s Johor
state to the north and Indonesia’s Riau Islands offshore to the south, whereas Johor and Riau are
not joined. Therefore, the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore growth triangle (IMS-GT) has only
two shared borders (see chapter 7).
12. These examples are from a series of Chicago Tribune reports: “High security, long delays,”
September 12, 2001, p. 17; “Nation’s open borders in spotlight,” September 26, 2001, p. 9; “Visas
add woes in wake of attacks,” September 29, 2001, pp. 1, 6; “Mexican trucking debate hits an-
other speed bump,” November 5, 2002, p. 7; “Merchants in Texas feeling the pinch,” November
2, 2001, p. 13; “Border crackdown vexes tribe,” December 30, 2001, p. 14; “Bush seeks more bor-
der security funds,” January 26, 2002, p. 8.
13. Under the initial procedures, foreign visitors traveling with visas would have two finger-
prints scanned by an inkless device and a digital picture taken. The information, stored as part
of the visitors’ travel records, would be used to verify visitors’ identities and to compare the in-
formation against a database of known and suspected terrorists and criminals. Future programs
and procedures would include phasing in exit procedures at air and sea ports by December 31,
2004, and phasing in entry and exit procedures at the 50 busiest land ports of entry by Decem-
ber 31, 2004, and at all land ports by December 31, 2005. See “Foreign visitors checked,” Chicago
Tribune, January 6, 2004, p. 20.
14. See “The crisis infecting cross-border relations,” accessed from the South China Morning
Post’s website (scmp.com) on May 7, 2003.
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